From Economic Crisis to Identity Crisis: The Spoliation of EU and National Citizenships. Research Paper in Law 01 / 2017 by Hatzopoulos, Vassilis
DEPARTMENT OF 
EUROPEAN LEGAL STUDIES
01 / 2017Research Paper in Law
From Economic Crisis 
to Identity Crisis: 
The Spoliation of EU and 
National Citizenships
Vassilis Hatzopoulos
  
 
European Legal Studies 
Etudes Juridiques Européennes 
 
 
RESEARCH PAPERS IN LAW 
 
1/2017 
 
Vassilis Hatzopoulos 
 
From Economic Crisis to Identity Crisis:  
The Spoliation of EU and National Citizenships 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Vassilis Hatzopoulos, 2017 
 
 
 
European Legal Studies/Etudes Juridiques Européennes 
Dijver 11 | BE-8000 Brugge, Belgium | Tel. +32 (0)50 47 72 61  
www.coleurope.eu 
  
From Economic Crisis to Identity Crisis: The Spoliation of EU and National 
Citizenships1 
 
Vassilis Hatzopoulos* 
 
 
 
For a long time, the debate was about whether the European Union could promote 
social or political rights, by giving Europeans a greater voice in their destiny, by 
promoting a European social model or even by promoting a budgetary virtue which 
would enable a vibrant future for social democracy. Now, the question is whether the 
European Union is compatible with anything but a shrunken citizenship for any of its 
citizens.2 
 
 
1. Introduction  
The relationship between European citizenship and national citizenship is a sweet-
sour one. If European citizenship is ‘destined to be the fundamental status of the 
nationals of the Member States’,3 and despite the consistent (?) efforts of the Court 
of Justice of the EU (CJEU, the Court) to give it autonomous status in relation to any 
other EU or national concept, it nonetheless relies heavily upon national citizenship. 
Normatively, the former depends on the latter, given that there is no autonomous 
system or criterion for attributing EU citizenship, but it is automatically attributed to 
‘every person holding the nationality of a Member State’.4 Materially, however, the 
relationship is more ambivalent. On the one hand the EU citizenship adds up to 
national citizenship by giving extra rights to the nationals of Member States, both to 
those moving abroad (right of entry, stay, non-discrimination and so on) and to those 
static in their Member State of origin (access to EU documents, right of 
communication with the Institutions and so on). On the other hand, those free movers 
who, in the name of EU citizenship, claim social benefits in other Member States, 
may be seen as ‘intruders’ in the web of rights and obligations composing the 
citizenship of the Member States concerned. Contrary to civil and political rights, 
social rights attributed to the citizens of any given Member State, have a cost and 
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need be financed by virtue of arrangements which correspond to delicate ideological, 
political, technical and financial choices. The EU citizen claiming access to the 
benefits of another Member State is a ‘free rider’ to such national citizenship 
systems. Under this perspective EU citizenship is openly antagonistic with national 
citizenship. As Giubboni has put it, ‘the active or expansive use of the principle of 
European transnational solidarity becomes tense—and, therefore, needs to be 
balanced—with the defensive use of the principle of national social solidarity’.5 
Symbiotic or antagonistic, national and EU citizenships have in common the fact that 
they gravely suffered from the financial and economic crises of the last eight years 
and, even more so, from the governance instruments put in place by the EU to tackle 
those. Since the main argument of the present is that the two kinds of citizenship 
have suffered alike, they are going to be examined jointly, in respect of the way they 
have been affected by the recent EU anti-crisis measures. The analysis will follow the 
classic Marshall taxonomy, according to which citizenship entails civil, political and 
social rights.6While distinct from economic rights as such and from the EU Internal 
Market and EMU, the above citizenship rights may be directly affected, both 
positively and negatively, from the EU economic rules. While the Internal Market has, 
up to some point, underpinned the development and strengthening of citizenship 
rights, the EMU, for its part has been, and is being, clearly detrimental. 
2. Civil rights in a contracting economy?  
According to Marshall civil citizenship rights are mostly ‘negative rights’ in the sense 
of free speech, mobility, free association, and more generally freedom to pursue 
one’s activity without being hindered from government restrictions. Such rights 
constitute the very heart of the EU. This was, to a large extent, true for the Rome 
Treaty of 1957 and remains true, with some nuances, for the current Lisbon Treaty-
based setup of the EU. The four fundamental freedoms, the right to move or set up 
shop in any other Member State, the free movement of capital, mutual recognition 
and the (legislated) application of the country of origin principle (especially in the 
digital economy), completed by the general prohibition of discrimination, have been 
the core of EU citizenship well before the concept itself was introduced by the 
Maastricht Treaty. It is no coincidence that the early jurisprudence of the CJEU 
strictly associated – and limited – EU citizenship to free movement rights.7 It is also 
true that, even after having recognized its autonomous, non-economic, nature, the 
Court has repeatedly used citizenship in order to complement the economic 
freedoms of EU citizens, where the scope of application of the relevant Treaty 
provisions was uncertain.8 
In view of the above, the EU has been characterized as ‘an uncommonly successful 
machine for the simultaneous production of supranational integration and 
transnational civil citizenship rights’.9 
The international financial crisis, followed by the euro-zone fiscal crisis, have caused 
unemployment to climb to unprecedented heights. Although crisis-hit countries, such 
as Greece, Portugal, Cyprus and Ireland have been the most severely afflicted, 
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others, such as Italy, Spain and France, have also been affected. Here and there the 
recipe followed has been to deregulate the labour market in order to render it more 
flexible. As it has been put, ‘flexicurity policies, which were already controversial, 
seem to have vanished into thin air, to be replaced by a return to absolute 
flexibility’.10 More importantly, the Memoranda of Understanding signed by Member 
States receiving EU bail-out funds invariably contain obligations to deregulate most 
of the remaining activities, to open up regulated professions and to liberalize the 
pursuance of most economic activities. In this respect the OECD toolkit11 and 
technical aid from the World Bank have been instrumental in pushing through 
reforms way more ambitious than the ones put in place in order to implement the 
Services Directive.12 Hence, for example,  in Greece, long-standing regulations 
concerning i.a. lawyers, notaries public, architects, accountants, tourist guides, open-
air market sellers and over a hundred other low/medium nuisance activities (such as 
grocery shops, small supermarkets, coffee shops, fast foods, restaurants and so on) 
have been struck down or, at least, made more rational. Several of these new rules 
were necessary in order to combat rent-seeking and to rationalize artificially 
fragmented markets, while others were imposed only on behalf of the (neo)liberal 
ideology they embody. Similar measures have been adopted in other ‘programme’ 
Member States, as well as in States wishing to ‘modernize’ their economies. 
One way or the other, by striking down government regulation, the measures 
adopted in view of facing the crisis – or at least in order to fulfill the requirements 
imposed by the international lenders under the principle of conditionality – seem to 
be strengthening civil citizenship of EU citizens. Under this perspective EU 
citizenship would be enhancing national citizenship and civil rights altogether. This 
finding, however, hardly corresponds to reality. 
For ‘programme’ countries, the above liberalizing reforms come as part of a wider 
package of measures of an essentially fiscal nature. Such measures typically include 
direct tax increases, wage and pension cuts, reduction of unemployment and other 
benefits, drop of healthcare expenditure, budget cuts in education and research and 
occasionally VAT increases. The most extreme example of all the above is Greece, 
where disposable income has dropped by 27.5 per cent between 2008 and 2016,13 
pensions have dropped by almost as much,14 money dedicated to education and 
research has been cut by more than 35 per cent,15 healthcare expenses have been 
reduced by almost 40 per cent16 and VAT has been increased to the upper cap of 24 
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‘Health effects of financial crisis: omens of a Greek tragedy’ The Lancet, 378 (9801), 1457-1458; these 
authors find i.a. that a) suicides rose by 17 per cent between 2007-09, 25 per cent between 2009-10 
and again 40 per cent between 2010-11, b) funding of public hospitals fell by 40 per cent during the 
same period, c) HIV infections rose by 52 per cent between 2010-11, together with drug addiction and 
prostitution and d) Greeks seeking free care by Médecins du Monde rose from 3-4 per cent before the 
crisis to 30 per cent in 2011; for a more recent account see Economou Ch. ea (2014), ‘The Impact of the 
financial crisis on the health system and health in Greece’, WHO/European Observatory, 
http://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/266380/The-impact-of-the-financial-crisis-on-the-
health-system-and-health-in-Greece.pdf, accessed  on 02 May 2017; see, more recently, the dramatic 
findings in Smith, H., ‘Patients who should live are dying: Greece’s public health meltdown’, The 
  
per cent, including for most basic goods and services. Similar trends- maybe not all 
at the same time and of the same degree- have been observed in most other 
Member States.17 
All the above, in combination with the global conjecture, result in anemic if not 
negative economic development in most EU Member States. This, combined with 
unprecedented levels of unemployment,18especially among the young,19 makes the 
enjoyment of civil rights quite theoretical. For, when a fourth of the population of a 
country lives under the threshold of poverty,20 one in every second/third young 
person is unemployed and the economy is hopelessly retracting for six years in a 
row,21 the abolition of regulatory hurdles to economic activity offers little relief; 
economic activity and, more generally, (most) civil rights are restricted by objective 
economic factors, unconnected to regulation. Therefore, even if, on paper, citizenship 
civil rights are favoured by the solutions followed/imposed by the EU in order to 
tackle the crisis, on the ground, reality gives the exactly opposite result, at least in the 
majority of EU Member States. The fact that in few Member States, notably in 
Germany, the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries, all the above numbers 
are (more) favourable, thus creating two opposing words within the EU, further 
frustrates the idea of an EU citizenship offering equality of rights and opportunities to 
all EU citizens.  This feeling of externally imposed suffering, lack of opportunity and 
social injustice stands for the rise of anti-systemic, ethnocentric to xenophobic 
political parties in all the Member States worst touched by the crisis: Syriza (currently 
in government) and the Golden Dawn in Greece, Podemos in Spain, the Five Stars 
Movement and the Northern League in Italy, the Portuguese Communist Party 
(currently in government), and the National Front in France.22 Needless to say that 
these parties are anti-EU and do little to promote the idea of a European identity, let 
alone a European citizenship.  
If the above erosion of EU citizenship is true for ‘static’ EU citizens (who do not move 
to any other Member State), things are much worse for those who do move abroad 
(free movers). Citizenship was supposed to empower citizens of a Member State to 
claim rights of entry, stay and equal treatment within the territory of any other 
Member State. The Court, for its part, has gone at great lengths, and has even been 
accused of activism,23 for strengthening the rights of moving EU citizens at the 
expense of national welfare systems (especially, but not exclusively, of the receiving 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Guardian 1/1/2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/01/patients-dying-greece-public-health-
meltdown, accessed on 02 May 2017. 
17 See e.g., for healthcare, Morgan, D. and R. Astolfi,(2015),‘Financial impact of the GFC: health care 
spending across the OECD’, HEPL 10(1), 7-19; and for a more general discussion of the crisis’s impact 
on healthcare see Appleby, J. e.a. (2015), ‘The global financial crisis and health care’,HEPL10(1), 1-6. 
18 Greece 23.4 per cent, Spain 19.5 per cent, Croatia 12.9 per cent, Cyprus 12.1 per cent, Italy 11.4 per 
cent, Portugal 11 per cent, France 10.5 per cent, are all above the Eurozone average which is 10.1 per 
cent; source Eurostat, August 2016, available at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Unemployment_statistics, accessed02 May 2017, well above that of the US which 
is around 5.6 per cent. 
19Greece 49.8 per cent (down from 58.3), Spain 46.2 per cent (down from 55.5), Croatia 43 per cent 
(down from 50), Portugal 32.8 per cent (down from 38.1), Cyprus 29.5 per cent (down from 38.9), 
Slovakia 26.2 per cent (down from 33.7), France 25.9 per cent (up from 24.9), Belgium 25.4 per cent (up 
from 23.7), Bulgaria 22.4 per cent (down from 28.4), all above the Eurozone average which is as high as 
21.9 per cent; same source as above.   
20 See http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/File:At-risk-of-
poverty_rate_before_and_after_social_transfers,_by_country,_2014.JPG, accessed02 May 2017. 
21 See ‘Greece economic outlook’ (2016), http://www.focus-economics.com/countries/greece, 
accessed02 May 2017. 
22It is true that anti-systemic parties also flourish in Member States less touched by the crisis; however, 
the crisis has been pivotal for their development there as well; see the following para.  
23 See e.g. Tryfonidou, A. (2012) ‘Redefining the outer boundaries of EU Law: The Zambrano, McCarthy 
and Dereci trilogy’, European Public Law,18 (3) 493-526. 
  
Member State).24 This, together with the fact that the Lisbon Treaty has 
mainstreamed several social objectives, strengthened legal bases in this field and 
made the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights compulsory, had nurtured high 
expectations for the development of the EU social model.25 The crisis, however, has 
brutally reversed this trend. ‘Rich’ Member States (with Germany and the UK on the 
forefront) try to curb social tourism26 and, in the process, openly question basic free 
movement acquis.27 The Court itself has validated such restrictive practices in Dano28 
(concerning the UK), Alimanovic29 (concerning Germany) and Garcia Nieto (also 
concerning Germany).30 It is worth noting that such retractions have come to be 
recognized in the aftermath of the expiration of the transitional periods limiting the 
mobility of citizens from new Member States.31 
The above clear retraction of citizenship rights,32 however, has not been enough to 
avert a Brexit vote in the UK referendum of June 2016. It is no secret that one of the 
most powerful arguments used by the Brexit campaigners has been the cost for the 
NHS and for the UK social services, in general, of EU citizens lawfully established in 
the UK.33 If Brexit marks the rejection, by the British, of the very concept of EU 
citizenship, it also poses a psychological limit to any future attempt to deepen the civil 
(let alone the social) rights of EU citizens moving to another Member State.  
Hence, if the structural reforms promoted in order to ease the crisis could enhance, in 
the medium/long term, civil rights of EU citizenship, in the short term they are having 
the exact opposite effect, both for static and for moving EU citizens. Such ‘short term’ 
effects, may not be as ‘short’ as the term indicates and may even be irreversible: 
when/if Brexit does materialize, EU citizenship, and all rights attached thereto, will be 
definitively foregone for the British – and correlatively for all EU citizens in the UK. 
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25 See, among many, Hatzopoulos, V. (2005), ‘A (more) social Europe: A political crossroad or a legal 
one-way? Dialogues between Luxembourg and Lisbon’, CMLRev, 42 (6), 1599-1635; on the same 
wavelength see more recently Damjanovic, D. (2013), ‘The EU market rules as social market rules: Why 
the EU can be a social market economy’, CMLRev, 50 (6), 1685-1718. 
26 In particular the UK government has introduced stricter eligibility measures and has cut down on 
welfare benefits, in order to reduce its appeal to putative free movers from poorer Member States; see 
Hewitt, Gavin (2013) ‘Clash over EU migrants and benefits’, BBC News, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-25117119, accessed02 May 2017; this in turn has provoked a 
similar debate in Germany, see Pop, Valentina (2013) ‘German conservatives stir up “welfare tourism” 
row’, EU observer, http://euobserver.com/social/122339, accessed02 May 2017. 
27 See e.g. Watt, Nicholas (2012) ‘David Cameron “prepared to halt immigration of Greeks into UK”’, 
The Guardian,http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2012/jul/03/david-cameron-immigration-greece-uk, 
accessed02 May 2017. 
28Case C-333/13, Dano, EU:C:2014:2358. 
29Case C-67/14, Alimanovic, EU:C:2015:597. 
30 Case C-299/14, García-Nieto and Others, EU:C:2016:114. 
31 On the broader issue of free movement, citizenship and the new Member States see Reich, N. 
(2005), ‘The Constitutional Relevance of Citizenship and Free Movement in an Enlarged Union’, ELJ, 
11(6), 675-698. 
32 For this retraction of citizenship rights see Barnard, Catherine (2017), ‘The day the clock stopped: EU 
citizenship and the single market’ in Koutrakos, P. and J. Snell (eds), Research Handbook on the Law of 
the EU’s Internal Market, Cheltenham UK and Northampton US: Edward Elgar, pp. 102-115; see also 
Urska S. and M. Rask Madsen ‘Did the Financial Crisis Change European Citizenship Law? An Analysis 
of Citizenship Rights Adjudication Before and After the Financial Crisis’ 22:1 ELJ (2016) 40-60. 
33 See e.g. Ηelm, T. (2016) ‘Brexit camp abandons £350m-a-week NHS funding pledge’, The Guardian, 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/sep/10/brexit-camp-abandons-350-million-pound-nhs-pledge, 
accessed 02 May 2017. 
  
3. Political rights in a universe dominated by non-elected, non-
accountable supranational bodies? 
The second set of rights attached to citizenship are, according to Marshall, political 
rights. Political rights entail the ‘right to participate in the exercise of political power, 
as a member of a body invested with political authority or as an elector of the 
members of such a body’. EU citizens enjoy political rights essentially at the national 
level and, subsidiarily, at the EU level. The EU responses to the crisis, however, 
encroach simultaneously upon national and EU political rights. The empowerment of 
those EU bodies which bear no democratic legitimation (such as the ECB), the 
creation of new fully unaccountable bodies within the EU (such as the ESM) and the 
conferral of important steering powers to non-EU bodies (such as the IMF) serve an 
important blow to both national and EU citizenships. This is true for ‘programme’ 
Member States and all other Member States alike. The latter are affected both when 
they are going through a crisis, as well as during ‘normal’ times. Hence, here again 
(as with civil rights), the responses to the crisis may be impairing citizenship in a 
permanent and profound manner.  
a. The exception: Member States under a programme 
When the fiscal crisis in the euro area erupted in 2010, the EU lacked the necessary 
mechanisms and experience to tackle it. Article 126 TFEU was not adequately 
designed to deal effectively with large scale fiscal crises. Moreover, the ‘no bail-out 
clause’ of Article 125 TFEU, another element of the fiscal discipline arsenal, seemed 
to pose an insurmountable obstacle to any direct funding of the public deficit of 
another Member State. Partly because of these reasons, partly for other, more 
political, reasons, the participation of the IMF in ‘salvaging’ ‘bankrupt’ Member States 
(Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Cyprus) has been judged indispensable. Hence, the 
IMF, for the first time in its history, has been called to participate in a programme for 
a Member State of the euro area. 
The IMF’s key policy instrument is the conditional loan, i.e. a loan which ceases 
being disbursed as soon as the beneficiary government fails to fulfil the IMF-imposed 
conditions. Such conditions typically are of a fiscal and a structural nature and are 
supposed to renew the country’s access to the markets. Since they are destined to 
convince commercial banks to start lending money to the country concerned, very 
often IMF conditions reflect the choices of such banks.34 
Conditionality has been used by the EU itself, but only vis-à-vis non Member 
States.35 Conditionality is applied in the framework of accession negotiations, the 
European Neighbourhood policy and other similar relations, where the EU offers 
technical assistance, capacity building, funding and prospects of closer cooperation 
against the undertaking, by beneficiary states, to perform specific tasks. By its 
inception, conditionality runs counter the principles of sincere cooperation, mutual 
trust and solidarity enshrined in the EU Treaties and should not be allowed to govern 
the relationships between Member States. Indeed, conditionality is deemed 
necessary in the relations with third countries specifically because all the above 
principles may not be granted outside the Union. Conditionality applied at the vertical 
level, i.e. between the Union and its Member States, also modifies the relations 
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between those, thus affecting the institutional balance (if one ever existed):36 it offers 
the EU an unedited means of dictating and forcing the implementation of policy 
choices to the Member States. With the participation of the IMF in the bailout of EU 
Member States, the principle of conditionality made its entry into the EU legal order; 
as it will be discussed in what follows it is here to stay. 
The IMF is a global institution issued from the Bretton Woods Conference (1994) and 
comprises 189 countries. Needless to say, EU citizens have no direct say 
whatsoever over the IMF’s decisions. The USA is the single most powerful player in 
IMF decision-making with 16.7 per cent of votes, almost three times up from the 
second country (Japan). Germany, the UK, France and Italy may have some 
leverage (with 5.39, 4.09, 4.09 and 3.06 per cent, respectively), while all other 
Member States, especially the ones of the periphery are insignificant players. What is 
more, the national representatives of Member States at the IMF are not subject to 
any kind of democratic selection or other legitimation procedure. To make things 
worse, given that the IMF’s objective is to help states gain access to lending by 
private Banks, it very often designs its own policies to reflect the Banks’ preferences. 
Moreover, those Banks (public or private) which are exposed to debt of the state 
concerned by the IMF programme, may find their way to the Fund’s decision-making 
through their national representatives, if they come from one of the ‘big’ IMF states. 
All in all, while being completely inaccessible to European citizens (especially those 
who do not come from Germany, France, the UK or Italy) and their democratic 
institutions, the IMF often reflects the interest of Banks and other financial 
institutions.  
The ECB, while being a European Institution, has been designed to be unaffected by 
politics, at the image of the Bundesbank.37 It has its President and Governing Board 
appointed by the European Council acting by qualified majority - thus offering big 
Member States the possibility of forming blocking minorities. Once in office its 
members are granted personal independence (Article 11 of the Statute of the ESCB 
and the ECB). It has been argued that they are hardly accountable to anybody and 
that ‘their future career prospects are the main things that outsiders can affect (eg 
lucrative private sector positions)’.38The European System of Central Banks (ESCB), 
for its part, which has supervisory functions, is composed by the ECB and the 
Eurozone’s central banks, the Governors of which are chosen outside the national 
political arena (although they are typically accountable to their national parliaments). 
What is more, the ESCB’s, and therefore also the ECB’s, primary objective is to 
maintain price stability; other Treaty objectives may only be pursued ‘without 
prejudice to the objective of price stability’ which is paramount.39 
The only European Institution participating in the ‘troika’ which may pursue a different 
– i.e. non-monetary – agenda, is the EU Commission. But, again, this is a body which 
is supposed to be technocratic and independent from national governments, while 
being indirectly accountable to the European Parliament (which has an active role in 
approving the nomination of its members and, in truly exceptional circumstances, 
                                                          
36 It should be noted that the concept of ‘institutional balance’ is perceived by most authors as a 
dynamic one. See Jacqué, J.-P. (2004), ‘The principle of institutional balance’, CMLRev, 41 (2), 383-391 
and Prechal, S. (1998), Institutional balance: a fragile principle with uncertain contents in Blokker, N. 
e.a. (eds), The European Union after Amsterdam, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, pp. 273-294. 
37 It has been noted that while traditionally the problem was to make sure that governments do not 
meddle with the operations of central banks, in these crisis years the issue is how to tame the ECB from 
intervening in internal politics, see Beukers, T. (2013), ‘The new ECB and its relationship with the 
Eurozone Member States: Between Central Bank independence and Central Bank supervision’, 
CMLRev, 50 (6), 1579-1620. 
38Greer, cited above note 2, p. 8. 
39 See Article 127 (1) TFEU. 
  
impeaching the Commission as a body). What is more, the Commission comprises 
several Directorates General, each pursuing its own agenda and, occasionally, 
speaking one against the other; but only the one on ‘Financial Stability, Financial 
Services and Capital Markets Union’ is directly represented in the troika. 
In view of the above, it becomes clear that the more power the troika is granted, the 
worse it is for the political rights of EU – and Member States’ – citizens. Indeed, the 
decisive role played by those non-democratic and unaccountable Institutions in 
reshaping the economic policies, and ultimately, the social contracts of ‘programme’ 
Member States, has actively alienated the relationship between political power and 
individual people, that is, political citizenship. This broken citizenship nexus is being 
evidenced by the outcomes of national elections: anti-systemic, populist ‘communist’ 
parties leading government coalitions in Greece and Portugal, or blocking the 
formation of a government for over a year in Spain, the rise of populist ultra-right, 
neo-nazi party in Greece and of Marine Lepen in France, the (almost) failed Italian 
referendum, all show that the way people relate to their polities and to one another 
has been deeply affected.  
This phenomenon has been aptly described by Snell as follows:40 
We tend to assume that citizens disgruntled with current policies can indeed vote for 
the opposition in the next general election. However, the various constrains imposed 
by European rules on national economic and fiscal policy may render the opposition 
incapable of pursuing policies which are substantially different. Change within the 
system is impossible. In such circumstances, it may be attractive and even rational to 
turn to extreme options that promise to change radically or overthrow the entire 
system. 
The above examples are drawn not only from Member States openly following an 
Economic Adjustment Programme (i.e. Greece, Portugal) but also from others which, 
whilst not directly under a conditionality regime had to implement, nonetheless, 
unpopular reforms under strong pressure from the same Institutions and from Banks 
(Spain, Italy and France). This should be particularly alarming in view of the fact that, 
under the new rules adopted for tackling the crisis, the decisive oversight of non-
democratic and non-accountable Institutions over national economic and social 
choices, has been institutionalized and made permanent. 
b. The norm: fiscal coordination post crisis 
In order to deal with the Greek, Irish and Portuguese crises, the EU has put in place 
several mechanisms. After the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism 
(EFSM),41 and the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF),42 nowadays, the 
European Stability Mechanism,43 with a budget of 700 billion euros, is supposed, 
together with the ECB and the Commission, to be able to tackle any ongoing and 
future crisis.44 More importantly, however, the EU has enacted a set of rules and 
procedures in order to prevent future crises. For this purpose, EU primary and 
secondary law, in the form of ‘six-pack’ and ‘two-pack’, has been complemented by 
                                                          
40 Snell, J., (2016) ‘The Trilemma of European Economic and Monetary Integration, and its 
Consequences’, ELJ22 (2), 157-179, 176. 
41 An interim body with a budget of 60 billion euros; Council Regulation (EU) 407/2010 establishing a 
European financial stabilization mechanism [2010] OJ L 118/1.  
42 A private company having as its shareholders the Eurozone Member States, incorporated under 
Luxembourg law; its budget was of 780 billion euros.  
43 An intergovernmental organization created by virtue of a Treaty signed by the Eurozone Member 
States, having its seat in Luxembourg.  
44 Thus making the participation of the IMF unnecessary.  
  
the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG, the Fiscal Compact), a 
traditional international agreement concluded by most EU Member States (but for the 
UK, Hungary and Croatia) and some non-Member States.45 
The ‘six pack’ consists of three Regulations and a Directive in the field of fiscal 
policy46 and two more Regulations in the field of macroeconomic imbalances;47 the 
‘two-pack’ adds two more Regulations to enhance effective supervision.48 The 
legislation creates a complex framework of coordination, mutual and centralized 
supervision, also known as ‘the European Semester’; it also allows for fines to be 
imposed on Member States violating budgetary rules and/or following bad statistical 
practices.49The system is supposed to put in place debt-brakes and entrusts the 
Commission with the task of monitoring the Member States’ performance against 
specific economic indicators. It also demands independent budgetary estimates 
agencies in the Member States. By its nature and objective, the system put in place 
favours beforehand surveillance by technocratic bodies over ex post accountability 
by democratic means and procedures.  
The TSCG, for its part, requires signatory Member States to put in place ‘debt-
brakes’ in order to make sure that structural deficit does not exceed 0.5 per cent (or, 
under specific conditions, 1 per cent) of GDP. Signatory parties are required to 
implement such brakes through provisions having ‘binding force and permanent 
character, preferably constitutional’ and to set up independent ‘budgetary discipline’ 
bodies. Hence, the TSCG ‘constitutionalizes’ a highly contestable economic theory, 
strongly criticized by most Nobel prized economists, while, in practice, making 
Keynesian aggregate demand management unconstitutional in the Member States! 
Governments, irrespective of their political ideology and economic/social 
programmes are constrained to follow this basic economic choice; they are also 
asked to modify accordingly their constitutions, each reflecting a particular 
constitutional history and the corresponding sensitivities. By the same token national 
governments are made subject to guidance, instructions and scrutiny by national and 
supranational non-accountable bodies. At the national level the new ‘budgetary 
discipline’ bodies will be active both in controlling expenditure and in defining what 
                                                          
45 On the legal, institutional and political implications stemming from the form and the content of the 
Fiscal Compact, see Calliess, C. (2012), ‘From Fiscal Compact to Fiscal Union? New Rules for the 
Eurozone’ in Barnard, C. e.a. (eds),Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 2011-2012, vol. 14, 
Oxford, UK and Portland, Oregon, US: Hart Publishing, pp. 101–118. 
46 European Parliament and Council Regulation (EU) 1175/2011 amending Council Regulation 
1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and 
coordination of economic policies, [2012] OJ L 306/12; Council Regulation (EU) 1177/2011 amending 
Regulation 1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure, 
[2011] OJ L 306/33; European Parliament and Council Regulation (EU) 1173/2011 on the effective 
enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro area, [2011] OJ L 306/1; Council Directive 
2011/85/EU on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States [2011] OJ L 306/41. 
47 European Parliament and Council Regulation (EU) 1176/2011 on the prevention and correction of 
macroeconomic imbalances, [2011] OJ L 
306/25https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sixpack_(European_Union_law) - cite_note-EIP_regulation-11; 
European Parliament and Council Regulation (EU) 1174/2011 on enforcement action to correct 
excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area, [2011] OJ L 306/8. 
48 European Parliament and Council Regulation (EU) 473/2013 on common provisions for monitoring 
and assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of excessive deficit of the Member 
States in the euro area, [2013] OJ L 140/11; European Parliament and Council Regulation (EU) 
472/2013 on the strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States in the euro 
area experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability, [2013] OJ 
L 140/1.  
49 For a comprehensive description of this new framework see, among many, Hinarejos, A. (2013), 
‘Fiscal federalism in the European Union: Evolution and future choices for EMU’, CMLRev, 50 (6), 1621-
1642; Ruffert, M. (2011), ‘The European debt crisis and European Union law’, CMLRev, 48 (6), 1777-
1806.  
  
structuraldeficit is. In the latter task they shall be aided – if not guided - by their peers 
(from bigger Member States), as they shall be operating as a network, and by 
Eurostat, the EU agency for statistics. Then, the Commission will be monitoring the 
aforementioned indicators and proposing ‘brakes’ as necessary. Finally, the CJEU 
will have the right to impose fines to non-conforming Member States. As Greer puts 
it, ‘[i]t may not be a good idea for democracy to decide to run a structural deficit of 
more than 0.5% of GDP; in the EU it is illegal’.50 And all the mechanisms, 
administrative, political and judicial, will be put to work to make sure that no Member 
State opts for the only economic policy that has a proven record of dealing with 
economic crises! Under these conditions, the futility of voting in national elections for 
a change of government, or in the EU Parliament for a different political majority, 
becomes all too visible; hence the high level of abstentions. Similarly, given that the 
basic economic and, hence, political, choices ensue from the implementation of the 
TSCG and are secured through the bodies and mechanisms described above, it is 
easier for voters to consider that all political parties ‘are the same’ and, hence, to 
vote for parties and politicians who are inexperienced, if not bluntly incompetent and 
dangerous. Further, the realization that the austerity measures which empoison 
voters’ everyday lives – and for which they have not voted, nor indeed have voted 
against - stem from their States’ participation to the Eurozone and the EU, transforms 
the ‘…exit’ scenario, otherwise embraced by the extreme right/left parties, into the 
main guarantor of democracy. All the above developments, already visible in most 
Member States, clearly weaken the political rights stemming from national 
citizenship, as well as the way these rights are being exercised. This weakening, 
however, is in no way compensated by some strengthening of political rights at the 
EU level. On the contrary, the non-democratic EU Institutions (the ECB, Commission 
and Court) are entrusted with the task of designing, implementing and monitoring 
policies which have been pre-determined outside the political arena. This not only 
has the effect of weakening EU citizenship but, most strikingly, of making it 
undesirable since the EU is perceived as shifting political power from national 
democratic bodies to supranational technocratic ones! Hence the British have voted 
against it and other Europhobic parties are on the rise. 
c. The role of the ECB 
Outside the formal fiscal coordination mechanism put into place after the crisis, the 
unclear (and questionable) role of the ECB should also be stressed. The ECB’s 
President had announced, in September 2012, that it would do ‘whatever it takes’ to 
stabilize the euro; what it does take is that the ECB proceeds to ‘Outright Monetary 
Transactions’, i.e. buying treasury bonds from troubled banks, subject to government 
compliance with conditionalities set by the rest of the EU. Given that for those 
Member States which are not under a programme the conditions with which they 
have to comply are all but clear, in actual fact the ECB offers itself wide discretion to 
second guess Member States’ economic policies. As a commentator has put it, 
‘[w]hat the ECB is doing, in essence, is setting itself up as the shadow government of 
Italy, Spain, Portugal, and perhaps Ireland. If the governments of those countries do 
what Draghi wants, Draghi will provide them with generous subsidy. If the 
governments of those countries don't do what Draghi wants, he'll use a monetary 
                                                          
50 Greer, cited above note 2, p. 16. This is all the more shocking, as the same author points out, given 
that ‘in 2010, when many countries were dealing with the effects of a revenue collapse and financial 
crisis, they all ran far higher structural deficits: the United States (8%), the UK (7.9%), Spain (7.5%), the 
Netherlands (5.7%), Ireland (8.6%) and Greece (7.4%). Even parsimonious Germany (3.1%) and Italy 
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laser to destroy their budgets’.51 To paraphrase that into a well-known tune ‘whatever 
Draghi wants, Draghi gets’… 
The OMT has come under fire before the CJEU in the famous Gauweiler case; the 
first ever preliminary question sent by the German Constitutional Court.52 The 
argument put forward was that the OMT was not covered by the ECB’s mandate and 
that it materialized economic rather than monetary policy. And despite the fact that 
the German Court in its question branded the threat of disavowing the CJEU’s 
judgment if the latter decided in favour of the legality of the OTM, the CJEU in a 
‘judgment of institutional empowerment’53 clearly stood by the ECB. In so doing, the 
CJEU put the stress on the intent, rather than on the effects of the projected measure 
(which has, in any event, not been implemented) and has expressly made conditional 
the legality of the scheme upon full compliance, by the Member States concerned, 
with the structural adjustment programme to which it is subject; this would preclude 
the OMT programme from being an incentive to dispense with fiscal consolidation.54 
This is problematic in at least two ways. First, although the content of conditionality is 
voluntarily left ambiguous, it is easy to assume that the general direction that 
Member States should follow is the same as that imposed under the ‘programmes’: 
welfare cuts, labour market reforms and the like. Second, a clear shift takes place 
here concerning the powers of the ECB: while it has been created as a non-political 
body specifically because it would be restricted to exercising monetary – as opposed 
to macroeconomic – policy, it is now using these supposedly technocratic powers in 
order to impose specific political choices. As Tridimas and Xanthoulis have put it, 
‘whilst allowing for institutional discretion, the interdependence between economic 
and monetary policy works mostly to the advantage of the ECB whose powers to 
pursue monetary policy objectives may have substantial and widespread spillover 
effects in economic policy’.55 
Other than the OMT, the ECB has also used other atypical instruments, such as the 
Securities Markets Programme (SMP), has occasionally eased its collateral 
requirements or has threatened to cut-off liquidity to banks; at the same time it has 
accepted national central banks providing emergency lending assistance (ELA), 
under the conditions set out in Article 14.4 of the Statute of the ESCB.56 All of the 
above have been associated with some form of conditionality which the Member 
State concerned had had to comply with. 
Last but not least, the ECB may affect Member States’ economic policies, through a) 
its participation in different policy fora, such as Euro-summits (and the informal 
                                                          
51 See Yglesias, M. (2012) ‘The European Central Bank’s Ongoing Power Grab’, Slate, 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2012/09/05/european_central_bank_bond_purchase_plan_it_ma
kes_sense_once_you_see_it_s_an_ecb_power_grab.html, accessed02 May 2017. 
52 Case C-62/14, Gauweiler, EU:C:2015:400; see i.a. the special issue 23 (1) of the Maastricht Journal 
of European and Comparative Law (2016) where over fifteen scholars and practitioners discuss the 
importance and the implications of this judgment; despite the doubts expressed by some of the 
commentators, the German Court did follow the CJEU in holding the OMT compatible with the TFEU 
and the German Constitution; see BVerfGe, 21 June 2016, 2 BvR 2728-2731/13 and 2BvE 13/13. 
53 Expression taken by Tridimas, T. and N. Xanthoulis (2016), ‘A legal analysis of the Gauweiler case: 
Between monetary policy and constitutional conflict’ in the abovementioned special issue of the MJ, 17-
39, p. 31. 
54 Gauweiler, para. 120; see also Tridimas and Xanthoulis, cited above note 53, p. 29.  
55 Tridimas and Xanthoulis, cited above note 53, p. 33. 
56See, Gortsos, C. (2015) ‘Last-resort lending to solvent credit institutionsin in the euro area: a detailed 
presentation of the Emergency LiquidityAssistance (ELA) mechanism’, in: ECB Legal Conference 2015 
– From Monetary Union to Banking Union, on the way to Capital Markets Union: New opportunities for 
European integration, European Central Bank (December 2015), pp. 53-76, available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=2688953, accessed 02 May 2017. 
  
summits of EU leaders preparing those); b) its status as observer in ESM (and before 
that in the EFSF);c) its general consultative functions under the TFEU and the six/two 
packs and d) its power to authorize and supervise significant banks headquartered in 
the Eurozone, under the Single Supervisory Mechanism.57 Last but not least, its role 
as member of the troika should not be overlooked.58 
Hence, if in the EMU the ‘M’ is the ECB’s exclusive competence the ‘E’ is also quite 
strongly impacted by the Bank’s choices. This discreet but effective power-grab 
operates at the expense of directly elected and/or immediately accountable bodies at 
the national level, thus violating simultaneously the attribution of powers, the 
democratic principle and the principle of subsidiarity. It need not be stressed that all 
the aforementioned principles are direct tributaries of citizenship, which is thereby, 
also, affected. 
d. And few words on the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) 
The ESM has been created by an international treaty between the Eurozone Member 
States ‘as an intergovernmental organization under public international law’ having a 
seat agreement with Luxembourg. Its Board of Governors is composed of the 
Finance Ministers of the participating Member States and decides either by a 
qualified majority of 80 per cent (votes being proportional to the respective capital 
subscriptions) or by unanimity. It also has a Chairperson. Its structure and way of 
operating directly resembles that of the IMF, and indeed, the ESM has been 
characterized as a regional copy of the former.59 It is fully intergovernmental 
(although the disputes between the members of its Board of Governors may be 
settled before the CJEU), and it is completely exempt from any parliamentary control 
or other political accountability. Such limitation of the democratic principle enshrined 
in Article 10(2) TEU is typically justified by a high degree of expertise and objectivity; 
it has, so far, operated in favour of the Commission, the ECB or some other EU 
Agency (which are somehow subject to the EU checks and balances). As Ruffert has 
put it, ‘[i]n terms of theory and practice of democracy, such compensation may 
already be considered as doubtful, but what is scarcely acceptable is the 
replacement – in a field of exclusive EU competence! – of parliamentary decision and 
independent expertise by the opaque process of Council or even Heads of State or 
Government negotiations’.60 
While the ESM’s main task is to intervene as a last recourse, in order to bail-out 
indebted Member States (and under the Direct Recapitalisation Instrument (DRI) also 
troubled banks), for which the ‘brakes’ and the other preventive measures and fines 
have not worked, it is also likely to assume a more regular role, by formulating 
economic policy goals and orientations, just like the IMF. It is worth noting, in this 
respect, that the Eurogroup’s recent decision to ‘facilitate’ the Greek debt,61 was 
                                                          
57See, Gortsos, C. (2015), The Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM): Legal aspects of the first pillar of 
the European Union, Athens, Nomiki Bibliothiki. 
58 On all these functions of the ECB and the way it becomes political see Beukers, cited above note 37; 
for a different, more favourable analysis, see Zilioli, C. (2016), ‘The ECB’s Powers and Institutional Role 
in the Financial Crisis’ in the special issue of the MJ cited above note 52, 171-184. 
59 Ruffert, cited above note 49, p. 1789; the same author notes (p. 1790) that in Europe, where the level 
of integration is substantially higher than that at the global level, with all the implications for democratic 
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60 Ibid, p. 1790. 
61 See Guarascio, Francesco and Alastair Macdonald (2016), ‘Euro-zone grants Greece short-term debt 
relief; no deal with IMF’, Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-eurozone-greece-eurogroup-
idUSKBN13T0ZN, accessed 02 May 2017. 
  
adopted on the basis of a proposal drafted by the ESM, whereby Greece had to 
accept further structural reforms. 
The discussion of political rights under the crisis could be usefully concluded by 
reference to Snell’s ‘trilemma’.62 Drawing on Rodrick’s writings,63 Snell claims that 
‘you cannot have at the same time a well-functioning EMU, mass politics and nation 
states’ and that ‘if we want monetary integration we have to choose whether to scale 
down national sovereignty or to abandon commitment to mass politics’.64 According 
to him, during the early period of EMU mass politics and national sovereignty were 
preserved at the price of an ailing monetary union, while the response to the crisis 
has strengthened the monetary union at the expense of mass politics (hence the 
appointment of technocratic governments, the dismissal of referenda etc); the way 
forward would be, according to Snell, to maintain a strong EMU and promote mass 
politics at the EU level, at the expense of the nation state.65 While this latter option 
would substitute national with EU citizenship political rights, the current situation 
simply curtails national political rights without offering any compensation. 
4. Social rights in the era of austerity and flexicurity? 
Reforms imposed under either the Economic Adjustment Programmes, or the Fiscal 
Compact are both short term – essentially fiscal- and long term – essentially 
structural. Fiscal measures go essentially in the direction of imposing welfare 
expenditure cuts, direct and indirect tax increases as well as, in some cases, special 
levies. Structural reforms typically include pro-‘competitiveness’ policies such as 
labour law deregulation, opening up the transport markets, administrative changes, 
and privatization of remaining state service providers.66 Structural reforms are often 
necessary and useful, but are, in general, more difficult to implement. As Greer puts 
it, ‘it is far easier to see Portugal comply with the call for cuts in health expenditures 
and taxes than it is to see it complying with the requirements for clinical guidelines, 
electronic prescriptions and such that richer countries under less pressure have 
implemented badly. The result is … a large-scale disaster for health care access and 
health outcomes’.67 Similarly, pension cuts, imposed on all southern Member States, 
are much more dramatic that most IMF/ECB/Commission officials may assume, 
‘given the frequency with which pension income is redistributed through extended 
families in a coping strategy common around the Mediterranean during hard times’.68 
The personal and family drama of the hundreds of thousands of people who are 
jobless or, even worse, do have a job but still cannot manage to cross the poverty 
line, may not be accounted for in any academic paper. Since citizenship is about 
belongingness – or, indeed, exclusion – the compilation of such personal dramas is, 
nonetheless, essential to understand the crisis’s impact on citizenship. It is not the 
place here to expound the vigour with which the crisis has hit the middle and lower 
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65 Ibid. 
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67 Greer, cited above note 2, p. 11. 
68 Ibid. 
  
classes. Some quantitative elements have been given above69 and various studies 
may complement, or indeed, give an even more gloomy view.70 More than 
quantitative data, however, qualitative developments show how social welfare has 
been eroded in all Member States; to a degree such that the idea that the welfare 
state, as we know it, is coming to a close, is being convincingly discussed.71 
Since the beginning of the crisis, the number of people below the poverty line has 
increased dramatically in all ‘programme’ countries72 while in Greece it has almost hit 
an unprecedented (in the EU 15) 40 per cent.73 Impoverishment has gone hand in 
hand with increasing income inequality in all ‘programme’ Member States.74 In the 
EU Social Justice Index for 2015, Greece scores 28th, Italy 25th, Spain 23th, Portugal 
20th and Ireland 18th, all well above the EU average and all in retraction compared to 
the previous year.75 It is worth noting that in Greece the 2011 tax reform reduced the 
taxable yearly income from 12.000 to 5.000 euros, that is, below the poverty line, set 
at 550 euros, per month, per person!76 Poverty and inequality negatively affect all the 
society in all Member States, but have a clear north-south and old-young distinction. 
In South-East Europe, in particular, children and the younger generation risk 
becoming a ‘lost generation’.77 
Another recent study concerning access to healthcare in selected countries from the 
entire EU notes that ‘even [in the rare cases] where a country’s health services have 
hardly experienced any cuts (such as all services in Luxembourg, and nursing home 
healthcare in Latvia), it has still been possible to identify impacts of the crisis on 
access to healthcare’.78 Hence, this report finds that the crisis has led to a) reduced 
availability of healthcare services, because of the closure of facilities, the severely 
cut, capped and delayed budgets, reduced reachability (because of cuts in opening 
hours, public transport and so on), stuff cuts and migration of healthcare personnel 
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50 per cent; see Petmesidou, M. (2013), ‘Is Social Protection in Greece at Cross-Roads?’, European 
Societies, 4 (15),597-616. 
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Employment Crisis and Poverty Risks’, South European Society and Politics 19 (3), 371-392; see also 
Matsaganis, M. and C. Leventi (2014), ‘The Distributional Impact of Austerity and the Recession in 
Southern Europe’, South European Society and Politics 19 (3), 393-412.  
75 Schraad-Tischler, D. (2015) ‘European economic and debt crisis: Children and young people are 
hardest hit’, Bertelsmann-Stiftung,http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/en/topics/aktuelle-
meldungen/2015/oktober/european-economic-and-debt-crisis-children-and-young-people-are-hardest-
hit/, accessed02 May 2017. 
76 Petmesidou, cited above note 70, p. 603.  
77Schraad-Tischler, D., cited above note 75; this report finds that ‘in Spain, Greece, Italy and Portugal 
alone, the number of children and young people who are threatened by poverty or social exclusion has 
increased by 1.2 million since 2007, from 6.4 to 7.6 million. They live in households with less than 60 per 
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78 Dubois, H. and D. Molinuevo (eds) (2014), ‘Access to healthcare in times of crisis’, Office of the 
European Union, http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/publications/report/2014/quality-of-life-social-
policies/access-to-healthcare-in-times-of-crisis, p. 1, accessed02 May 2017. 
  
and diminished awareness of how to use the healthcare system; and b) reduced 
coverage for healthcare services, because of loss of insurance coverage in general 
or of coverage for specific services in particular, increase of out-of-pocket payments. 
At the same time the needs of individuals for healthcare services have increased 
because of i.a. increased mental health problems, unhealthier eating habits and cuts 
in preventative health services.79 
Unemployment, especially among the young is extremely high in all ‘programme’ 
countries,80 while the number of long-term unemployed (and thus, more difficult to 
integrate into the labour market and more at risk of losing any security net and being 
marginalized) has also been on the rise.81 At the same time brain drain is taking its 
toll in all countries touched by the crisis: a recent study showed that from those 
emigrating from Ireland, Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain, 88 per cent hold a 
university degree and, of these, 50 per cent hold a Masters degree, while another 
11.7 per cent hold Ph.Ds.82 
Those who do have an employment are not immune to the crisis either. Despite the 
vivid contestation of the idea that liberalization of the labour market eases 
unemployment,83 both the structural reforms pushed through in the ‘programme’ 
countries and the general policy orientations given to Member States in the 
framework of the ‘fiscal compact’, strongly points in that direction.84 Hence, under the 
impact of the crisis governance, several protective labour laws are being struck down 
and employment conditions, the same as unemployment benefits, become 
increasingly insecure.85 In an independent but concomitant way, the EU Court, in the 
name of the free market, has imposed a transnational brake to national collective 
negotiations and collective actions.86 In doing so, however, the Court, while 
recognizing it verbally, has in fact denied the fundamental nature of the right to strike: 
‘what the Court has accomplished is not a balancing-act between two equally-footed 
rights, but a much more traditional scrutiny of compatibility between national rules 
and Community law… Thus, the recognition of the right to strike as a EU 
fundamental right is concretely (and paradoxically) resolved in its “de-
fundamentalization”’.87 
Increasing poverty and inequality, unstable and uncertain employment, high and 
permanent unemployment and deteriorating health, form altogether a good recipe for 
the alienation of individuals and their exclusion from the status of citizen; exclusion 
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http://globalgovernanceprogramme.eui.eu/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/SURVEY-REPORT-Emigrating-
in-times-of-crisis.pdf, accessed 02 May 2017. It is also worth noting that favourite destinations for these 
emigrants are Germany, the UK (pre-Brexit), the Netherlands, Switzerland, USA, Canada and Belgium.  
83 See ETUI working paper, cited above note 66. 
84 See above note 5. 
85 See also Moreira, A. e.a. (2015), ‘Austerity-Driven Labour Market Reforms in Southern Europe: 
Eroding the Security of Labour Market Insiders’ European Journal of Social Security17 (2), Special 
Issue: Welfare States under Strain in Southern Europe: Comparing Policy and Governance Changes in 
Portugal, Greece, Italy and Spain, 202-225. 
86 Case C-438/05, Viking, EU:C:2007:772  and Case C-341/05, Laval, EU:C:2007:809. 
87 Passages taken by Giubboni, cited above note 5, p. 17, himself drawing from Faro, Lo (2011), 
‘Toward a De-fundamentalisation of Collective Labour Rights in European Social Law?’, in M.-A. Moreau 
(ed.), Before and After the Economic Crisis. What Implications for the ‘European Social Model’?, 
Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, US: Edward Elgar, pp. 203-216. 
  
which at the bottom end takes the form of social marginalization, while at the top end 
the form of emigration. Both outcomes are immediately prejudicial to the way the 
individuals concerned experience their national citizenship. The same outcomes are 
also indirectly prejudicial to EU citizenship, since the increased flows of EU citizens 
from poorer countries towards rich ones, combined withthe rights such free movers 
enjoy according to the CJEU’s individualistic case law,88 often backfire at the 
expense of free movers and citizenship itself; Brexit, is the extreme example, but not 
the only one, where local societies react against ‘citiz-intruders’.  
Such a reaction is not altogether unjustifiable from a purely normative viewpoint. As 
Giubboni puts it  
[t]he seemingly unstoppable spill-over of the anti-majoritarian logic of transnational 
opening to outsiders, that is typical of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the 
Court’s case law, in fact, challenges the capability of the Member States to maintain 
adequate levels of social protection and distributive justice within their borders at the 
same time as the new economic and monetary Constitution of the Union, in 
responding to the financial crisis, imposes increasingly severe and pervasive 
supranational constraints on the national democratic Welfare State systems. Union 
law deprives Member States of decisive levers of political-democratic control over 
their welfare systems, without being able to compensate for such a partial loss in 
delivering distributive social justice at a supranational level.89 
Hence, Giubboni rejoins Scharpf in finding that the asymmetry between negative and 
positive integration is dangerously widened, thus leaving a hiatus more important 
than before. This acquires special significance for the entire European construct at a 
time where, to stick to Scharpf’s taxonomy, the crisis has spectacularly cropped 
output legitimacy’, while the institutional response to it has considerably diminished 
the, already ailing, ‘input legitimacy’ of the EU.90 
                                                          
88 For which see above notes 23-24. 
89 See above note5, p. 19. 
90 On the limited capacity of the EU to promote positive, as opposed to negative, integration in the social 
field see Scharpf, F. (2002), ‘The European social model: Coping with the challenges of diversity’, 
JCMS, 40, 645–670 and more recently, by the same author, (2011), ‘Monetary Union, fiscal crisis and 
the preemption of democracy’, LSE ‘Europe in Question’ Discussion Paper Series; LEQS Annual 
Lecture Paper 2011, www.lse.ac.uk/european Institute/LEQS/LEQSPaper36.pdf, accessed 02 May 
2017. It should not be forgotten that the idea that the EU enjoys more output than input legitimacy has 
also been put forward by Majone, G. (1998), ‘Europe's “Democratic Deficit”: The Question of Standards’, 
ELJ, 4 (1),5-28 and Moravcsik, A. (2004), ‘In Defence of the “Democratic Deficit”’: Reassessing 
Legitimacy in the European Union’, JCMS, 40 (4), 603-624; this distinction, however, has been subject 
to criticism, see i.a. Gaus, D. (2010), ‘Two kinds of democratic legitimacy for the EU? Input and output 
legitimacy as a case of conceptual misformation’, http://www.uio.no/english/research/interfaculty-
research-areas/democracy/news-and-events/events/conferences/2010/papers/Gaus-
TwoKindsOfDemocraticLegitimacy-2010.pdf, accessed02 May 2017. 
88Davies, Gareth, (2015) ‘Democracy and Legitimacy in the Shadow of Purposive Competence’, ELJ, 21 
(1), 2-22, 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
The above ugly outlook is not likely to get any better under the current constitutional 
setup of the EU, given that its purpose-oriented competences ‘prevent meaningful 
democratic processes from taking place because they render certain goals non-
negotiable, and thereby pre-empt essential choices of policy direction’, while, at the 
same time, reducing its emotional appeal.91 
Under this perspective, the stakes are much higher than the mere enjoyment of EU 
citizenship – it is the very European integration project which is called into question.  
5. Conclusion 
This chapter looked into the newly set economic governance of the EMU (and the 
EU) and the way it has affected citizenship, both at the national and at the EU level. 
In Member States under financial supervision drawn into detailed structural and 
economic reforms and subject to the conditionality principle, as well as in all other 
Member States bound by the Fiscal Compact, the six-pack/two-pack and the 
European Semester, citizenship is being eroded both internally and externally. All 
three components of citizenship, according to Marshall, are losing: civil rightssuffer 
from the irrational tax burden imposed on certain categories of the population and the 
ensuing retraction of the national economies; political rights are offered a big blow 
from the transfer of crucial decision making powers to unelected and unaccountable 
institutions such as the ECB or the IMF; and social rights, together with the welfare 
state on which they are based, succumb to the ‘golden rule’ of balanced budgets and 
other ‘fiscal consolidation’ measures.  
Hence, the EU and more particularly the EMU and its rules have the effect of directly 
affecting the rights that citizens draw from their national citizenships, within their own 
Member States. Given that national identity, shaped through national citizenship, is 
strongly embedded in the Member States, citizens intuitively distance themselves 
from the factors that question their identity. Hence, the rise of euroscepticism. 
Things are even worse in relation to European citizenship. The fact that Brexit has 
been successfully campaigned on the reduction of the benefits and rights the EU 
Court and legislature have progressively recognized in favour of EU citizens, is only 
the tip of the iceberg. The rise of ultra-right parties in most other Member States 
directly undermines the ‘easiness’ with which an EU national should be received in 
any host Member State. The unhappy management of the migrant crisis only adds up 
to the suspicion towards anything non-national.  
All in all, it may be said that while the Treaty of Lisbon and the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, underpinned by the (occasionally activist) case law of the 
CJEU, have promoted, in a peremptory manner, an idealistic vision of EU citizenship, 
the EU management of the financial and economic crises have served a discrete but 
severe blow to it. 
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